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Abstract 
Contracts for health services in the British National Health Service (NHS) take a 
number of different forms. This paper reviews and then tests the economic theory of con-
tracts as applied to the provision of health services. We find that contracts used in the 
NHS can be reconciled with predictions from contract theory, that there is stronger evi-
dence of incentives than of risk sharing influencing the form of contract used and that the 
presence of clinicians in contract negotiations affects the form of contract used in a way 
that is consistent with them reflecting the interests of patients. We consider the implica-
tions of these findings for policy towards publicly funded health services.  
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1. Introduction  
The reform of the British National Health Service (NHS) that started in 1990 resulted in 
health services that are purchased by means of a contract between a Health Authority1 or a 
fundholding2 General Practitioner (GP) practice and an NHS Trust Hospital3 or private 
hospital. The form of these contracts is varied and continues to change as purchasers and 
providers learn more about the nature of the contracting process. There are, at present, at 
least four different forms of contract used in the NHS. One explanation for the variety of 
NHS contracts is to be found in the economic theory of contracting. Contract theory is 
concerned with examining what forms of contract will best achieve the aims of purchas-
ers. It therefore suggests that the form of contract that is adopted will vary in a consistent 
way with such factors as the nature of the services being contracted for, the aims and ob-
jectives of purchasers and providers who are parties to the contract and the information 
that is available at the time a contract is written. The purpose of this paper is to empiri-
cally assess the predictions of contract theory in relation to the forms of contract that are 
used in the NHS. We use two sources of data and consider the relationship between con-
tract form and observable characteristics of the services being purchased, the purchaser, 
the provider and other exogenous variables using a multinomial logit model. For both 
data sets we find significant relationships, which can be reconciled with contract theory. 
We also find that it is possible to discriminate between an incentive based explanation of 
the form of contract adopted and a risk sharing explanation. Although, given data limita-
tions, the evidence needs to be interpreted cautiously we find more support for an incen-
tive explanation than for a risk sharing one. We further find that the form of contract cho-
sen depends on whether clinicians are involved in contract negotiations and that the effect 
of having clinicians present is consistent with them reflecting the interests of patients. 
This last finding, therefore, provides some justification for the Department of Health’s 
policy of recommending the inclusion of clinicians in the contracting process. The most 
prevalent form of contract in the NHS allows the possibility of costs being taken into ac-
count in determining payment to hospitals which mirrors recent evidence from the US 
which indicates that even the, supposedly cost independent, prospective payment system 
has an element of cost dependency - see McClellan (1997). Whilst the potential gains 
from reimbursing costs have been discussed from a theoretical perspective, there has not 
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previously been evidence on whether cost reimbursement is used in practice when it is 
most appropriate. Our findings provide such evidence and are, therefore, relevant to the 
policy debate regarding the regulation of publicly funded health service purchasing.  
In the context of health services, contract theory has been most extensively applied to 
discussing the merits of the US Medicare reforms that started in 1983 and which affected 
the form of contract that Medicare uses to purchase health services for the elderly. Prior to 
1983 Medicare purchased health services by repaying the costs incurred by the suppliers 
of those services. The form of contract between purchaser and provider was therefore 
termed cost reimbursement. From 1983 Medicare, under a system that has become known 
as prospective payment, specified a fixed price for the treatment of patients who fall 
within a defined Diagnosis Related Group (DRG). The relative merits of cost reimburse-
ment and prospective payment have been well researched. Attention has focused on the 
twin concerns of health care purchasers to keep costs down and to ensure that health ser-
vices are of appropriate quality. Whereas cost reimbursement gives no incentive for pro-
viders of services to keep costs down, prospective payment gives little apparent incentive 
to maintain quality. However, if a provider faces a demand for its services that depends 
upon quality, prospective payment may give appropriate incentives. Allen and Gertler 
(1991) and Rogerson (1994), for example, consider how a price per treatment can be set 
so as to induce appropriate choice of quality in these circumstances. An alternative to re-
lying on price is to allow partial reimbursement of costs so that Ellis and McGuire 
(1986), Ellis and McGuire (1990), Glazer and McGuire (1994) and Pope (1989) analyse 
contracts with a combination of a fixed price and partial cost reimbursement. Ma (1994) 
shows that, under appropriate conditions, prospective payment can achieve both efficient 
quality and efficient effort to reduce costs. Chalkley and Malcomson (1998b) consider 
how, when those conditions are not met, alternative prospective contracts can achieve ef-
ficiency, whilst Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a) consider how an element of cost shar-
ing can re-emerge, when first best outcomes are not feasible, as a means of establishing 
the second best. A common theme in this theoretical literature is, therefore, a distinction 
between contracts that specify payment varying with either (or both) of volume of activity 
and the costs associated with that activity. We henceforth refer to such variation as vol-
ume dependency and cost dependency respectively.  
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Whilst there is an extensive theoretical literature on health contracts, there has not 
previously been the opportunity to test that theory directly. Following the introduction of 
prospective payment, a number of studies such as, DesHarnis et al (1987), Freiman et al 
(1989), DesHarnis et al (1990), Cohen and Spector (1996) and Ellis and McGuire (1996) 
have considered the implications of the switch to prospective payment for treatment qual-
ity and cost. This literature provides evidence that the incentive properties of prospective 
payment posited by theory exist in practice but cannot be used to assess whether purchas-
ers deliberately use incentive contracts that are appropriate to the circumstances in which 
they purchase health services because in Medicare purchasers do not have a choice of the 
form of contract that they enter into. Recently, McClellan (1997) has considered the ex-
tent to which prospective payment is, in practice, retrospective (as a consequence of 
DRGs that are defined in terms of treatment rather than diagnosis) and finds evidence that 
there is cost reimbursement under prospective payment. The question as to whether the 
health services that are subject to cost reimbursement are the ones that theory suggests 
cost reimbursement is most relevant to is not, however, addressed. 
2. Contracts in the NHS  
The reformed NHS provides an interesting and novel testing ground for contract the-
ory because of the discretion that purchasers and providers are allowed over the type of 
contract they adopt. In the NHS the most prevalent form of contract, at least initially, sim-
ply specified a lump sum payment. These are termed block contracts.4 Some contracts, 
which have become known as sophisticated block contracts combine a lump sum pay-
ment with some arrangement for determining payment should the actual volume of ser-
vices fall outside of the expected or indicative volume range. Sophisticated block con-
tracts typically do not precisely specify what payment will be made in the event that the 
indicated volume of services is not met but they allow the possibility of ex post negotia-
tion. A more precise (ex ante) linkage between payment and the quantity of services de-
livered is contained in a cost and volume contract. Typically, in this kind of arrangement a 
fixed payment is agreed to cover the delivery of services up to some limit, thereafter ser-
vices are paid for at an agreed rate per case. Finally a small number of services are con-
tracted for on the basis of cost per case contracts in which a fixed price is attached to a 
particular treatment. 
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These different forms of contract exhibit variations in cost and volume dependency.5 
Using this categorisation, block contracts contain no element of either cost or volume de-
pendency and have no equivalent in health care systems in the US. Cost per case contracts 
are a simple (linear) form of volume dependency with no element of cost dependency. 
Cost and volume contracts are a more complex (non-linear) form of volume dependency 
with again no element of cost dependency. Sophisticated block contracts, because of their 
lack of precision in defining payment when volume thresholds are breached are more dif-
ficult to classify. The existence of volume as a trigger for re-negotiation indicates a kind 
of ex post volume dependency. For example, a typical sophisticated block contract con-
tains the following statement regarding payment if volume is below the defined threshold: 
“Where projected activity appears unlikely to meet the minimum volume 
specified in (paragraph) 6.2 the Authority will wish to re-negotiate the 
Contract Price on the basis of a marginal cost adjustment or agree with the 
Service Provider what action is to be taken to achieve it” 
In the NHS contracts that are explicitly cost-dependent are not permitted. However, 
there is evidence that sophisticated block contracts allow ex post cost dependency again 
through the possibility of re-negotiation. For example, the following relates to the case of 
volume exceeding an upper threshold: 
“The maximum volume specified in (paragraph) 6.2 must not be exceeded 
without the Authority’s prior agreement ....in which case consideration will 
be given to case mix in determining the contract price” 
In this quotation, the reference to case mix indicates one mechanism for, ex post, in-
corporating costs into the contract payment. Some sophisticated block contracts also al-
low for re-negotiation triggered by cost considerations as, for example, in the following: 
“Where projections indicate that the maximum number of completed con-
sultant episodes as specified above cannot be achieved for the contract 
price, the Authority should be informed as soon as this situation becomes 
clear. The Authority would only consider a re-negotiation of the contract 
(price) if cost increases can be shown through documentary evidence to be 
beyond the Service Providers control and if they exceed 1% more than the 
agreed inflation allowance in paragraph 7.4 below” 
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Because the contracts observed in the NHS exhibit variation in terms of both cost and 
volume dependency, they provide an opportunity to assess the predictions of contract the-
ory. In the next section of this paper we begin by reviewing in more detail the reasons 
suggested by contract theory for cost and volume dependency in contracts for health ser-
vices. In that discussion we, for convenience, refer simply to purchasers and providers of 
health services without detailing the institutions prevalent in the NHS. We then, in Sec-
tion 3, detail our empirical study of contracts in the NHS based on two data sets and relate 
the theoretical predictions discussed in Section 2 to the observed variables. Section 4 of 
the paper reports the results of the empirical investigation and the final section of the pa-
per discusses those findings.  
 
3. Theoretical issues 
The starting point for a consideration of health contracts is the perceived concern of a pur-
chaser to obtain both the quality and quantity of health services that it wants at a cost that 
it is prepared to pay. Since decisions that affect all of these aspects of health services are 
taken by the provider of those services and cannot be easily monitored, the form of con-
tract that is chosen will have an important effect upon incentives. This is what, following 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), is called a multi-task principal agent problem. The 
analysis of this problem lies at the heart of much of the consideration that has been given 
to contracting for health services. See, for example, Ma (1994) and more recently Chalk-
ley and Malcomson (1998b) and Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a). To draw some em-
pirically testable propositions from that analysis we focus on the question of when it 
might be appropriate for a purchaser to incorporate either cost dependency, volume de-
pendency (or both) into a contract. The literature suggests that (i) the characteristics of 
health services, (ii) the motivation of providers and (iii) information (available at the time 
a contract is written) about the precise diagnosis of patients (the case mix) and about costs 
of delivering health services need to be considered when discussing the desirability of 
cost and volume dependency.  
It is useful, as a benchmark, to consider the conditions that are necessary for a block 
contract (one with neither cost nor volume dependency) to achieve a purchaser’s objec-
tives and then consider the implications of moving away from these conditions. 
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3.1 Block contracts 
A block contract entails no cost or volume dependency and therefore, as with any contract 
that does not reimburse costs, provides incentives to engage in cost reducing effort. How-
ever, the payment that will be received by a provider will be independent of the many 
other decisions that it takes regarding the kind of services it provides. In particular, the 
quality of treatment that the provider chooses to offer will not affect its remuneration. It is 
usual to assume that a publicly funded purchaser has a concern for the interests of patients 
and, hence, for the quality of treatment that is offered. Therefore, a necessary condition 
for choosing a contract that does not provide any mechanism for rewarding the provider 
for serving patients interests would appear to be that the provider itself should be con-
cerned for patients interests. This is the case of what can be called a benevolent provider. 
However, benevolence on its own is not enough to make a block contract acceptable to a 
purchaser because there are issues that the purchaser needs to address concerning varia-
tion in both the demand for and cost of services. 
One problem that arises when the number of treatments that it is efficient to carry out 
is not known in advance is considered by Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a). The number 
of treatments required may be unknown either because of uncertainties about the demand 
for, or cost of, a particular treatment. If demand is too high or treatment is too costly, the 
amount given to the provider in a block contract may turn out to be too little and the pro-
vider may end up turning patients away towards the end of the budget period. This indeed 
was a feature of the NHS in the early stages of contracting. Such an outcome is unlikely to 
be efficient. If, on the other hand, the provider is given a large enough budget to treat all 
of the patients who might require treatment, the purchaser will have used up valuable 
funds6 that it could have deployed elsewhere. In both cases, Chalkley and Malcomson 
(1998a) show that, provided there is symmetry of information ex post, a block contract 
can be improved upon by incorporating some volume dependence. 
A related problem will arise even when the overall demand for treatments is predict-
able but when the case mix is uncertain provided there is, nevertheless, symmetry of in-
formation ex post. Again, conditioning payment on the volume of the particular types of 
patients that present themselves for treatment, i.e. adding volume dependency, will im-
prove upon a block contract. In practice it is unlikely that case mix will be observed by 
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the purchaser, in which case we need to consider the implications of asymmetric informa-
tion which are discussed below.  
Hence, from a theoretical perspective, the precise requirements for a block contract to 
achieve what the purchaser wants are very stringent even when there is a benevolent pro-
vider. Generally a block contract can be improved upon when there is uncertainty over 
demand by incorporating some volume dependency. When providers are not benevolent 
or there is asymmetry on information there are reasons for incorporating both cost and 
volume dependency. 
 
3.2 Provider objectives 
The antithesis of a provider that shares the concerns of the purchaser for patients is 
one that has regard only for its own welfare. Such a provider can be called self-interested. 
The question of how to ensure, through a contract, that a self-interested provider delivers 
the kind of health services that the purchaser wants has been extensively researched. 
The essential tension in the case of contracting with a self-interested provider is be-
tween ensuring incentives to supply high quality and incentives to keep costs down. To 
keep costs down a contract that avoids reimbursing costs will give appropriate incentives. 
Therefore, self-interest on the part of a provider would appear to exert pressure away from 
cost dependency. However, the problem with any payment system that does not reimburse 
the costs of a self-interested provider is that it apparently gives little incentive for that 
provider to produce high quality services, unless there is some mechanism that links a 
hospital’s revenues to the quality of treatment it offers. The literature on health contract-
ing has considered that one possible mechanism for making this link is patient demand. 
Ma (1994) shows that, provided that patients can perceive the differences between pro-
viders in terms of the quality of treatment that they offer and can respond to those differ-
ences by choosing where to be treated, a volume dependent payment has the potential to 
ensure the provision of the quality of health services that a purchaser would like to see. 
Chalkley and Malcomson (1998b), considering a case where it might not be efficient to 
treat all those who demand treatment, show that a contract can be improved by condition-
ing payment on a measure of excess demand as well as volume of treatments. In any case, 
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at least in a symmetric information setting with patients who are aware and respond to 
quality, there are good reasons for not incorporating cost dependency.  
If patients are either unable to assess the actual quality of health services that a pro-
vider delivers or unable to respond to any perceived quality differentials, it may be neces-
sary to make contracts cost dependent if the purchaser is concerned to maintain quality. In 
the usual terminology, it is when quality of health services is an experience good rather 
than a search good that contracts need to be cost dependent according to this argument. 
This conclusion needs, however, to be treated cautiously. If a provider is purely self-
interested, it will be very costly to ensure quality through cost reimbursement because 
costs will have to be reimbursed (at least) in full and there will then be an incentive to in-
flate costs. Cost dependency is a more plausible mechanism for ensuring quality when a 
provider at least partly shares the concerns of the purchaser for patients. In such circum-
stances it is possible to partially reimburse costs in order to induce the provider to supply 
higher quality - see Chalkley and Malcomson 1997. 
Most of the literature on health contracts considers strictly short term relationships. In 
such circumstances the objectives of a provider are important because it is necessary to 
build incentives into a single period contract. Where a purchaser deals repeatedly with the 
same provider it may be possible to observe performance over time. In any case, contract 
renewal can be made conditional upon aspects of performance that cannot easily be writ-
ten into a short term contract. If reputation is an effective mechanism for ensuring that 
appropriate actions are taken by a provider, it may replace either cost or volume depend-
ency in the incentive roles discussed above.   
3.3 Asymmetric information  
There are other reasons for supposing that some element of cost reimbursement 
might be a desirable feature of contracts for health services. The literature on procurement 
discussed in Laffont and Tirole (1993), for example, focuses on the problem of a pur-
chaser not having precise information about what the costs of supply are going to be 
whilst facing a provider that is better able to assess those costs. In such circumstances an 
optimal payment schedule will involve partial reimbursement of costs. In the case of 
health services uncertainty about costs would appear to be an important aspect of the con-
tracting problem because the case mix is not known in advance and a provider is much 
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better able than a purchaser to determine the precise case mix it experiences. The quota-
tions from NHS contracts cited in the Introduction illustrate precisely this issue. It is, 
therefore, likely that when there is substantial variation in costs across the case mix, cost 
dependency becomes more important. 
3.4 Allocating risks 
The discussion above has focused on the incentive properties of contracts and has 
thus followed closely the literature on health contracting. The conventional approach of 
contract theory as discussed by Hart and Holmström (1987), emphasises the importance 
of the form of contract on the allocation of risks between parties. As noted above, the de-
mand for many health services is uncertain as is the precise case mix that might face a 
provider. In addition to its concern with guaranteeing the delivery of health services and 
being frugal with its budget, a publicly funded purchaser may also, in such circumstances, 
be concerned with ensuring an efficient allocation of risk between itself and any providers 
that it deals with. A block contract, for example, will result in a provider being exposed to 
considerable variation in its income net of costs. Whether such an arrangement is desir-
able depends on the relative degrees of risk aversion of the purchaser and the provider and 
the extent to which an individual contract affects total income. If, for example, a provider 
contracts with many purchasers and the demands for its services from these different pur-
chasers are uncorrelated, it may not matter that its income from any one purchaser fails to 
reflect fluctuations in demand. But, if a provider contracts with only one purchaser it will 
wish to have some insurance against fluctuating income. Both cost and volume depend-
ency in the contract can help in this respect. Hence, the more risk averse is a provider or 
the greater is the variation in the demand for its services or its costs, the greater will be 
the pressure to include either (or both) cost or volume dependency in a contract, whilst the 
less able to offer insurance is the purchaser the less likely is cost or volume dependency.  
It is worth noting that these traditional risk allocation issues are difficult to resolve in 
the context of a publicly funded institution like the NHS. Health authority purchasers 
have more resources than providers but are also on strictly cash limited budgets and are 
not, therefore in a good position to act as insurers. NHS Trust providers are small in rela-
tion to health authority purchasers but have some (albeit limited) ability to run a deficit or 
surplus in any given year.7 
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The theory discussed above suggests a complex set of determinants of cost and vol-
ume dependency which we summarise in Table 1. 
4. An empirical study of contracts in the NHS 
4.1 Data 
We had available two sources of data. The first is copies of 236 contracts, all of 
which are drawn from the first round of contracting following the reforms of the NHS ini-
tiated in 1990. This data derives from either computer scanned copies of contracts as re-
tained by the National Association of Health Authorities and Trusts (NAHAT) or from 
hard copies of actual contracts that were obtained from NAHAT. The second source of 
data derives from a telephone survey of health authority purchasers and contains summary 
information on 582 contracts from the 1993-1994 round of contract negotiations. In nei-
ther case do these contracts represent the outcome of unbridled free choice on the part of 
health authorities or fundholding GP practices as to the kind of contractual arrangement 
that they wished to enter into but rather they are a consequence of purchasers exercising 
some discretion whilst operating within guidelines set by the National Health Service Ex-
ecutive (see Robinson and Le-Grand (1993)). 
4.1.1 Data set 1 
For each contract in the first data set we could identify the date of the agreement, the 
duration of the agreement and information on a number of relevant characteristics.  
First, and most importantly for this study, the form of the contract can be categorised 
into one of four types: block, sophisticated block, cost and volume, and cost per case. 
Since contracts do not specify their form according to this categorisation, we categorised 
them by examining their exact terms. We observe only 8 cost per case and 17 cost and 
volume contracts. Henceforth, we treat cost per case and cost and volume contracts as a 
single type denoted Other because of the paucity of the data and because, as discussed 
above, they have essentially the same characteristic of volume dependency with no cost 
dependency. 
Second, the type of services that were being contracted for can be categorised into 4 
groups: acute hospital services, non-acute hospital services, mental health services and 
community health services. The type of service has relevance for a number of the factors 
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identified above as important in the choice of contract. There is, for example, much 
greater uncertainty about what volume of services it is desirable to have delivered in the 
case of many acute service for which the demand varies considerably from year to year 
compared with mental health services, which have historically varied only little from year 
to year. Concerning the nature of quality of health care it is less likely that patients have 
information about mental heath services, which are delivered to only a small number of 
individuals than about some acute services which are widespread and where individuals 
are, therefore, likely to have had contact with those who have direct experience of the 
treatment given by a particular hospital. 
Third, we observe the nature of the purchaser (which can be either a health authority 
or GP fundholder) and some characteristics of the provider, such as whether it was an 
NHS Trust and whether it was in the same district as the purchaser. The distinction be-
tween GP fundholders and health authorities is potentially important because GP fund-
holders might, because they have more detailed information on their own patients, be ex-
pected to be better able to judge the quality of services that are delivered than a health au-
thority. GP fundholders also have only small fixed budgets to spend on their patients and 
are permitted to purchase only a limited range of services. We observe whether, in the 
case of a health authority it contracts with a provider that is in its area or not. Local pro-
viders can typically expect long term relationships with their purchaser and hence in con-
tracting with local providers, purchasers can rely to a greater degree on reputation to en-
sure the provision of high quality services 
For each health authority contract we also observe the name of the health authority. 
This makes it possible to control for different priorities that health authorities might have 
in purchasing health services. 
In addition to information about specific contracts we also had access to the Depart-
ment of Health’s Health Services Indicators for the year 1991-1992. This data set con-
tains many socio-economic measures for each health authority as well as providing in-
formation on the number of hospitals and GPs that each health authority has within its 
area. 
4.1.2  Data set 2 
In the second data set we also have information on the form of the contract but in this 
case as reported by the purchaser. Hence, in this data set there are 3 reported contract 
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types, block, sophisticated block and cost and volume. There are no instances of cost per 
case contracts and so for consistency with our terminology for Data Set 1 we refer to cost 
and volume as other. By the date of the telephone survey the term sophisticated block 
contract was in common usage and although we could not go back and check whether the 
same criteria were used in defining these contracts as we had used for the first data set, 
other information on these contracts is consistent with their categorisation. Most contracts 
were sophisticated block and all contracts in the second data set have a health authority 
purchaser. 
The type of services contracted for are categorised in the second data set only as ei-
ther acute (hospital), community or mental health services. Whilst there is no way of dis-
criminating between different types of provider directly, the survey asked about the role 
played by clinicians in contract negotiations. This may provide indirect evidence of the 
priorities placed by a provider on representing patients’ interests and so it is a potentially 
interesting variable from the perspective of contract theory. 
Additionally, in the second data set, we have details on the kind of information avail-
able in the contracting process, specifically, it was reported in the survey whether there 
was consideration of individual treatment costs or simply overall costs in formulating a 
contract price. 
4.2  The empirical model 
We consider the choice of contract type as being a consequence of observable charac-
teristics of the services being contracted for, observable characteristics of the purchaser 
and the provider and other socio-economic factors with naturally some random influences 
that cannot be observed playing a role. We suppose a contract is chosen to best meet the 
objectives of the purchaser and assume that the various factors discussed in Section 2 will 
influence the choice of contract. To capture this in as simple a way as possible we sup-
pose that a health authority derives utility from contract i being of type j according to: 
U b Xij j i ij= + ε  
where X i  is a vector of observations on contract i and εij  is a disturbance drawn from an 
extreme value distribution. Letting yij be a binary variable that takes the value one if a 
contract i is of form j and zero otherwise, then : 
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where Pij  denotes the probability that contract i is of type j = 1,2,3 corresponding to, re-
spectively, block, sophisticated block and other (cost and volume or cost per case). The 
likelihood function for the data, given that we observe N contracts is, therefore: 
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The parameters bj  measure the effect of X i  on the (log of) relative probability of observ-
ing a contract being one of two types. We normalise initially such that b1 0=  and, hence, 
probabilities are expressed relative to that of a block contract. In order to compare sophis-
ticated block and ‘other’ contracts we normalise such that b2 0=  The components of X i  
and their summary statistics are reported in Table 2  whilst the distribution of contracts 
observed is depicted in  Figure 1. 
4.3 Relating observations to theory 
We consider, as a starting point, the pattern of the growth of services in the NHS over 
the last 34 years. Table 3 summarises aggregate growth in hospital acute, non-acute and 
mental health services (no comparable data are available for Community services). 
Acute services include most of the medical and surgical procedures carried out in 
hospitals, including those delivered by accident and emergency departments. Many of the 
contracts we considered covered a range of acute services. The precise mix of treatments 
that might be delivered under an acute contract could, therefore, vary considerably. This is 
analogous to variation in case-mix and, assuming that a hospital is better able to assess 
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the precise mix of patients that it receives, is a reason to expect cost dependency. The 
demand for acute services is also according to aggregate data more variable than for other 
categories of service. In part some of the variation in demand is absorbed through waiting 
lists, which in the NHS perform the role of a buffer stock. But for at least some acute ser-
vices, for example accident and emergency procedures, variations in demand must be met 
with treatments. Theory suggests that this will contribute to volume dependency firstly  
because contracts need to ensure that hospitals have appropriate incentives to treat needy 
patients and second to offer some protection to hospitals from variation in their incomes. 
Non-acute services are concerned with the treatment of chronic illness or disability 
and are largely accounted for by geriatric services in the NHS. In the UK as in the US (see 
Norton (forthcoming) and Norton and Newhouse (1994)) there is perceived to be chronic 
excess demand and limited capacity. From an incentive viewpoint, excess demand rela-
tive to capacity means that there is greater certainty regarding the volume of services that 
the purchaser can have delivered because this is determined by capacity and that there 
may be less need for volume dependency, if providers can be relied upon to be concerned 
about their patients. If, as seems likely, the recipients of non-acute services have relatively 
little choice and providers cannot be relied upon to deliver high quality, then cost depend-
ency will be important. 
Mental health services have a number of distinctive characteristics as a category of 
health care provision (see DesHarnais, S. I., Wroblewski, R. and Schumacher, D. (1990)) 
and particularly in the context of the NHS. First, there is relatively little variation in the 
total demand for these services over time (indicated both by the low overall growth rate 
and as measured from historical data on finished consultant episodes (FCEs) per 1000 of 
population and by number of hospital admissions). Second mental health services consti-
tute a small (less than 10% of total hospital expenditure in the NHS) but tightly defined 
set of services. Third the average cost of a FCE where mental illness is the originating 
cause is very high because the average duration of hospital stay is long (56 days for men-
tal illness and 200 days for forensic psychiatry in 1992/3 compared with 8.5 days for car-
diothoracic surgery, for example) but the cost per day is relatively low (£123 for mental 
illness compared with £425 for cardiothoracic surgery in 1992/3, for example). Hence, the 
number of FCEs is relatively small. Finally, partly due to the relatively small scale of 
these services and partly because they are sometimes delivered to individuals who are 
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deemed incapable of rational decisions, there is relatively little patient choice as to where 
to be treated. The predictability of demand coupled with lack of patient choice reduces the 
need for volume dependency. Whilst the need to provide incentives for high quality works 
in the direction of increased cost dependency, the relative homogeneity of mental health 
services (a more certain case mix) may work against this suggesting an overall ambiguous 
prediction.  
Community services, which include health visiting and some geriatric at-home ser-
vices, are unlike many hospital acute services in that they are likely to be supplied up to 
the capacity of the health care system rather than constrained by demand. There is there-
fore likely to be less uncertainty regarding the quantity of such services that the health au-
thority would like to see delivered. Community services are also characterised by prob-
lems of measuring activity. For hospital services the FCE is a standard measure of activ-
ity. No comparable measure exists for Community Services. This suggests that the cost of 
incorporating volume dependency is high and that such dependency is, therefore, unlikely. 
Nevertheless community services, like non-acute services, are such that patients are often 
perceived to have little choice about who provides them. This is because in the case of 
community services the location of the provider is of paramount importance. In such 
cases theory suggests that contracts will need to incorporate cost dependence. 
Contracts for multiple services benefit a provider, enabling it to diversify the risk of 
uncertain demand which should, therefore, make cost and volume dependency less neces-
sary from the perspective of sharing risk. However, where multiple services are being 
contracted for possible variation in case mix would seem to be of great importance. This 
should lead to greater cost dependency. Such contracts, therefore, provide an indirect way 
of testing competing theories of contract choice. If contracts for multiple services are gen-
erally less cost and volume dependent than other contracts the risk spreading aspects of 
contract choice would appear dominant, If, however, such contracts incorporate more cost 
dependence, there is prima facie evidence in favour of incentive effects being dominant. 
The interpretation of the effect of a provider being an NHS Trust is not clear. At the 
time when the contracts for which this variable is observed were in operation, the alterna-
tive to Trust status was a hospital that was a Directly Managed Unit (DMU) and therefore 
still under the management of a Health Authority. One possibility that has been discussed 
is that the adoption of Trust status moves a provider away from the central ethos of the 
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NHS and, therefore, might be synonymous with a need for the purchaser to provide 
stronger incentives for it to act in patients’ interests. If this view is accepted then there 
would need to be more cost and volume dependency in contracts with Trusts. 
A health authority's information regarding the quality of services provided by hospi-
tals external to its own area is likely to be less good than its information concerning hos-
pitals that were previously directly managed by it. It is also less likely to be engaged re-
peatedly with the same external provider. These facts mean that mechanisms within a 
contract to ensure high quality are of greater importance. Both cost and volume depend-
ency have a role to play in providing incentives to produce higher quality and so the pre-
diction from theory is that such contracts should be more cost and volume dependent. 
If GPs have better information than a health authority regarding the quality of service 
that a provider offers and they have freedom to use that information in directing patients, 
incentive arguments suggest that the contracts that they write should have less volume 
and cost dependency than contracts written by health authorities. In contrast with the ar-
gument concerning multiple services, the requirements of efficient risk sharing reinforce a 
tendency towards less cost and volume dependency in contracts. GP's have small budgets 
relative to most providers which should make them inclined to prefer contracts which en-
tail certain payment. 
The effects of competition variables are difficult to predict from the perspective of 
contract theory. The hypothesis that greater competition between providers reduces the 
need to structure quality incentives in contracts is one possibility. However, for the rea-
sons considered by Spence (1975), the effect of competition on quality is not obvious. 
The industrial organisation literature - see Tirole (1989) - suggests that it is likely that 
competition affects the price at which a contract is carried out, but that does not necessar-
ily have any implications for the form of contract that it makes sense to use. Competition 
between purchasers has similar ambiguous consequences for the choice of contract form. 
The presence of clinicians at negotiations may indicate something about either the 
organisation or the objectives of a provider. If clinicians represent the interests of patients 
they may move a provider in the direction of what we have referred to as benevolence 
above. In which case, compared with a self interested provider (for which cost reim-
bursement is a very costly mechanism for ensuring quality) it can be expected that con-
tracts will be more cost dependent. However, there is not any clear suggestion from theo-
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retical considerations regarding the effect of such a concern for patients on volume de-
pendency. If, for example, clinicians are so powerful as to lead a provider away from self 
interest and towards benevolence, as described above, it may be possible to reduce vol-
ume dependency and still ensure an adequate quality of service. But if there is only a par-
tial movement towards benevolence, volume dependency may remain a valuable incentive 
for delivering quality. 
In the second data set the information variable potentially captures how much cost in-
formation is available to use in a contract. The interpretation of this is, however, also dif-
ficult. On the one hand better information on costs enables contracts to be written in terms 
of prices per treatment and so facilitates volume dependency. On the other hand the better 
is information on costs ex ante the less need there would appear to be to write contracts 
which are ex post cost dependent. Unfortunately, from the structure of the telephone sur-
vey it is not clear that respondents would necessarily report the information that is avail-
able ex ante rather than ex post. 
The predictions from theory regarding the effect of the observable variables on cost 
and volume dependency are summarised in Table 4. 
5. Results 
The model described above was estimated separately on both data sets using the 
maximum likelihood criterion via the LIMDEP package. For the first data set, we initially 
included all of the components of X i  and then dropped the health authority dummy vari-
ables that were insignificant. This procedure resulted in all of the health authority dum-
mies except D15 (Eastbourne DHA), D19 (North Tyneside DHA) and D34 (Cambridge 
DHA) being dropped. For the second data set, we report the results obtained from includ-
ing all of the available components of X i  which reduces the size of our sample (because 
of missing observations on CLINSIG) to 480 observations. 
In both cases, when reporting results we use contracts for mental health services as 
the default. There are a number of ways of summarising the estimates of the multinomial 
logit model but since the purpose here is to examine the extent to which the predictions of 
contract theory are confirmed or refuted by the data the most useful results are those that 
express the effect of X i  on the relative probability of a contract being one of two forms. 
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This comparison is made in  Table 5 and Table 7. A corresponding summary of the effect 
of each of the explanatory variables on the probability of each different form of contract 
(that is the marginal effect of observable variables on the overall probability of a contract 
being of a given type) is in Table 6 and Table 8. As is standard practice these marginal 
effects (and their associated t-ratios) are evaluated at sample means. 
We focus on the statistically significant effects identified. Where a contract is for 
acute services, the likelihood of it being sophisticated block relative to it being block is 
increased as is the likelihood of it being ‘other’ relative to it being block. Overall con-
tracts for acute services are more likely to be sophisticated block and less likely to be 
block. This is, of course, relative to the default of contracts for mental health services. 
Where a contract is for non acute services, the likelihood of it being sophisticated 
block relative to it being block is increased with no significant effect on the relative like-
lihood of block and ‘other’. Overall contracts for non acute services are more likely to be 
sophisticated block.  
In contrast to the above, where a contract is for community services the likelihood of 
it being ‘other’ relative to it being block is decreased. At reduced level of significance 
there is also a reduction in the likelihood of it being ‘other’ relative to sophisticated block. 
Overall contracts for community services are more likely to be block. 
Where a contract is for multiple services the likelihood of it being sophisticated block 
relative to it being block is increased as is the likelihood of it being ‘other’ relative to it 
being block. Overall contracts for multiple services are more likely to be sophisticated 
block and less likely to be block. 
Where a contract has a GP purchaser the likelihood of it being sophisticated block 
relative to it being block is decreased. Overall contracts with GPs are more likely to be 
block and less likely to be sophisticated block.  
Contracts where an NHS Trust is the provider have a decreased likelihood of being 
sophisticated block relative to being block. Overall these contracts are less likely to be 
sophisticated block and more likely to be block. 
An increase in the number of providers in an area reduces the likelihood that a con-
tract is block and increases the likelihood of it being sophisticated block. 
An increase in the number of purchasers has few well defined effects. Overall it mar-
ginally increases the likelihood of block contracts.  
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Where a contract has a provider from outside of a health authority's area the likeli-
hood of it being sophisticated block relative to it being block is increased as is the likeli-
hood of it being ‘other’ relative to it being block. At a reduced level of significance there 
is an increased likelihood of it being ‘other’ relative to it being sophisticated block. Over-
all contracts with outside providers are less likely to be block and more likely to be so-
phisticated block. 
Only three of our health authorities exert significant effects on the choice of contract 
form. Of these the strongest effects are for D34 (Cambridge) which favours block con-
tracts and avoids sophisticated block.  
The most notable feature of the results from data set 2 with regard to the type of ser-
vice being contracted for is their consistency with the results reported above. In this data 
set there were no contracts for multiple services. 
The novel elements in data set 2, CLINSIG and INF, also have some significant ef-
fects. 
The presence of clinicians in contract negotiations significantly increases the likeli-
hood of sophisticated block relative to block and overall increases the likelihood of so-
phisticated block and reduces the likelihood of block.  
The information variable has more marginal effects. Greater information is signifi-
cantly associated only with a lower likelihood of block contracts. 
6. Discussion 
At the time contracts were initiated in the NHS there was considerable scepticism as 
to the degree of sophistication which purchasers and providers would bring to the contract 
negotiations. However, the view that contracts are chosen arbitrarily would appear to be 
resoundingly rejected by the data. The view that contracts are chosen at the whim of indi-
vidual purchasers is also resoundingly rejected. We find only three purchaser dummies 
that are significant in explaining the form of contract adopted. The results summarised 
above exhibit many statistically significant effects that are consistent across two inde-
pendent data sets. The nature of the services being contracted for, characteristics of the 
purchasers and the providers significantly influence the outcome in terms of the form of 
contract that is observed. This is, therefore, strong evidence that purchasers and providers 
are acting consistently and according to some principles in choosing their contracts. 
21 
Are the principles being adopted consistent with those suggested in the extensive 
theoretical literature on health contracting? To relate the empirical findings to our theo-
retical predictions it is necessary to refer back to cost and volume dependency in the dif-
ferent forms of contracts. A movement from block to ‘other’ (cost per case plus cost and 
volume) is an unambiguous increase in volume dependency as is a move towards sophis-
ticated block from block, which is also indicative of an increase in cost dependency. A 
movement from ‘other’ to sophisticated block is indicative of increased cost dependency 
but cannot be safely interpreted as either an increase or a decrease in volume depend-
ency8. Combining these observations,  Table 9 directly compares the empirical findings 
with our theoretical predictions.  
The empirical findings, therefore, accord well with our discussion of contract theory 
applied to health services. In the case of acute services, for example, the greater demand 
variability and case mix variation that characterises these services is predicted to lead to 
both greater cost and volume dependency and this is what we find in practice.  
For non-acute services we noted that, since there is relatively little expression of pa-
tient choice, more cost dependency is indicated if providers do not reflect a purchaser’s 
concerns for patient. Theory was ambiguous in predicting volume dependency for non-
acute services because of two competing effects. First, these services are subject to more 
variation in demand than mental health services which are used as the basis for compari-
son. On purely risk sharing grounds we should, therefore, expect more volume depend-
ency in contracts for non-acute services. Secondly, however, from the perspective of in-
centives, there is a greater certainty over the volume of services that providers would like 
to have delivered because this is limited by capacity. In the presence of benevolent pro-
viders, for example, this would lead to the adoption of contracts with less volume de-
pendency. We find that contracts for non-acute services are, in fact more volume depend-
ent. This, therefore is consistent with an incentive view conditional upon providers not 
being benevolent. 
For community services the lack of volume dependency is hardly surprising given the 
difficulties in even defining activity levels for these diverse services. We argued that cost 
dependency was however, likely to be an important element of contracts for these services 
because of the perceived lack of patient choice which arises because of the predominance 
of local providers for such services. Our empirical findings do not reject this view be-
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cause there is some evidence of increased cost dependency in the favouring of sophisti-
cated block contracts over ‘other’ but the results are not significant at the usual 95% level.  
Contracts for multiple services provide a way of discriminating between incentive 
and risk sharing motivations for contract form. If, as seems reasonable, a greater diversity 
of services gives a provider some insurance against fluctuations in demand for any one 
type of service, contracts for multiple services can be less cost and volume dependent. 
According, however, to an incentive view of contracts a greater range of services may 
lead to a greater variation in the mixture of patients that a provider will have to treat. If 
the provider is not to skimp on quality for the most difficult patients an element of cost 
dependency is important. We find significantly more cost dependency in contracts where 
there are multiple services and, therefore, more support for this incentive view than for 
the risk sharing view.  
Contract theory did not provide us with any clear indication of the effect of Trust 
status. It has sometimes been suggested that the granting of independence to hospitals in 
the NHS would result in them being less concerned with patients’ interests. If this view is 
true then the first hospitals to convert to Trust status might be expected to be those that 
were more independently organised and, perhaps, already less concerned with their pa-
tients. The data provide a way of testing this view and it is rejected. If Trusts were more 
self interested than other providers we would expect purchasers to impose stronger incen-
tives in contracts with trusts than with DMUs but we find the opposite. In the early days 
of contracting in the NHS, Trusts were subject to less cost and volume dependency in 
their contracts, not more.  
We have argued that an incentive based view of contracts suggests that external pro-
viders may need to be subject to stronger incentives in their contracts because of weaker 
reputation effects. The greater cost and volume dependency that we find in contracts with 
external providers therefore suggests further support for this incentive view. This is an-
other instance where the data allow some degree of discrimination between theories. 
There is no obvious reason why external providers should require more insurance against 
fluctuation in either demand or costs than local providers, so it hard to account for our 
finding using a risk sharing argument.  
Both because they have small budgets, and are therefore likely to want certainty over 
their expenditures, and because they are better able to assess the quality of service than 
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health authority purchasers, we expect GPs to write contracts with less cost and volume 
dependency. This is supported by the data. 
From theoretical considerations alone, the effect of competition variables on cost and 
volume dependency in contracts is ambiguous. An important question is whether, for ex-
ample, increased competition between providers generates positive incentives towards 
high quality so that contracts need to include less high powered incentives. The evidence 
available in our data suggests that it does not. We, in fact, find no significant effects of 
competition on cost and volume dependency in NHS contracts. This finding is consistent 
with  the lack of an impact for competition elsewhere in the NHS as found, for example, 
by Propper and Wilson (1996). As regards the effect of increased competition in terms of 
number of purchasers, the only effect we find is towards less cost dependency in con-
tracts. There is, as far as we are aware, no obvious explanation for this and it may be an 
issue worthy of further consideration. 
One policy issue that our results shed light on concerns the involvement of clinicians 
in contract negotiations. One of the Department of Health’s “seven imperatives for con-
tracting” (see National Audit Office (1995)) is for “involvement of Doctors in the con-
tracting process”. If clinicians did not exert much impact on the outcome of the contract 
negotiations they were involved with, this might not be an important issue. However, the 
data suggest that clinicians do exert a significant influence and that influence can be in-
terpreted as being consistent with them representing the interests of patients in a way that 
purchasers may well favour.  
A second policy issue that this research has a potential input on is the use of cost de-
pendency in contracts for health services. Contract theory has flourished as a vehicle for 
considering contracts for health services, particularly where there is a publicly funded 
purchaser. Within this literature a number of reasons why cost dependency might improve 
contracts have been suggested. However, it has not previously been possible to assess the 
relevance of that theory to practice because instances of purchasers actually choosing the 
form of contract that they enter into are very limited. In this important respect the British 
NHS provides an interesting test bed. The expectation at the time that the reforms of the 
NHS were proposed (see National Audit Office (1995)) was that contracts would move 
rapidly towards volume (and volume alone) as the conditioning variable for payment. In 
fact contracts in the NHS are predominantly of the sophisticated block form which, we 
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have argued, displays only limited volume dependency but allows some possibility of cost 
dependency. Are health purchasers in the NHS simply slow to react or are they respond-
ing in a way that is entirely consistent with the predictions of economic theory, perhaps 
choosing those contracts that really do best meet their needs? The evidence from this em-
pirical study is consistent with the second view and, hence, provides support for contract 
theory. It, therefore, has policy implications for both the US and the UK health care sys-
tems where cost dependency in contracts is often viewed as undesirable. Evidence from 
this study for the UK and from McClellan (1997) in the US suggests that cost dependency 
is a feature of payment systems. If health authorities in the UK are correctly reflecting 
their concerns in choosing contracts, then theory suggests that there may be good reasons 
for permitting, or even encouraging, that cost dependency. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
Factors Increasing Volume Dependence Factors Increasing Cost Dependence 
Types of Health Ser-
vices 
 Uncertain Demand 
 
 
 
 
 Uncertain Case Mix. 
 Quality that can only be 
‘experienced’ 
 Patients unable to choose where 
to be treated. 
Characteristics of 
Providers 
 Objectives that are not aligned with 
those of purchaser. 
 Risk aversion 
 Absence of a reputation with (or 
long term commitment to) the pur-
chaser 
 Objectives that are not aligned 
with those of purchaser. 
 Risk aversion 
 Absence of a reputation with (or 
long term commitment to) the 
purchaser 
Characteristics of 
Purchasers 
 Ability to absorb risk  Ability to absorb risk 
 
 Poor knowledge of quality of 
service, combined with a concern 
for quality 
Table 1: factors affecting cost and volume dependency in health contracts. 
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Variable Description Sample Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Data Set 1 
Sample Mean 
(Std. Dev.) Data 
Set 2 
AC Equal to 1 if the contract includes acute ser-
vices and zero otherwise. 
0.29 0.33 
HNAC Equal to 1 if the contract includes non-acute 
hospital services and zero otherwise. 
0.2 n/a 
MH Equal to 1 if the contract includes mental health 
services and zero otherwise 
0.21 0.35 
CS Equal to 1 if the contract is for community 
health services and zero otherwise 
0.2 0.32 
MULTIPLE Equal to 1 if the contract is for more than one 
of the above and zero otherwise 
0.1 0 
TRUST Equal to 1 if the contract is with an NHS Trust 
and zero otherwise 
0.07 n/a 
EXT Equal to 1 if the provider is external to the 
boundary of the health authority’s region and 
zero otherwise 
0.15 0.21 
GP Equal to 1 if the purchaser is a fundholding GP 
and zero otherwise 
0.07 n/a 
PURCOMP A measure of purchaser competition equal to 
the number of GP fundholders per 100,000 of 
population. 
0.51 
 (0.52) 
n/a 
PROVCMP A measure of provider competition equal to the 
number of providers of similar services in a 
given geographical area. 
2.1  
(5.33) 
n/a 
D1,D2 etc. Equal to 1 if a purchaser is a specific District 
Health Authority 
Range: 0.005 to 
0.07 
n/a 
CLINSIG Equal to 1 if clinicians are included in contract 
negotiations and are reported to have a signifi-
cant influence 
n/a 0.35 
INF A measure of the amount of information avail-
able during contract negotiations ranging from 
1 = only activity levels to 5 = specific cost data 
on sub-specialities 
n/a 3.09 
 (1.75) 
Table 2: Observed variables and summary statistics (n/a = data not available) 
 
Service Average Growth9 
percent 
Variability about trend growth10 
Acute 3.5 0.11 
Non-acute 4.6 0.07 
Mental 1.3 0.04 
Table 3: Growth and variability of broadly defined services in the NHS 
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Variable Expected effect on  
volume dependency 
Expected effect on  
cost dependency 
AC + + 
HNAC ? + 
MH - ? 
CS - + 
MULTIPLE - (if risk dominates) 
? (otherwise) 
- (if risk dominates) 
+ (otherwise)_ 
TRUST ? ? 
EXT + + 
GP - - 
PURCOMP ? ? 
PROVCMP ? ? 
CLINSIG ? + 
INF ? ? 
Table 4: Expected effects of observable variables on cost and volume dependency in NHS contracts. 
 
 Sophisticated Block 
relative to Block     
Other relative to  
Block 
Other relative to 
Sophisticated Block 
variable coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Constant 0.660 
(1.098) 
-1.457 
(-1.605) 
-2.117 
(-2.709) 
AC 1.955 
(2.589) 
2.273 
(2.462) 
0.318 
(0.453) 
HNAC 1.935 
(2.426) 
0.917 
(0.850) 
-1.017 
(-1.206) 
CS -0.635 
(-1.288) 
-2.775 
(-2.224) 
-2.140 
(-1.775) 
MULTIPLE 3.956 
(2.784) 
3.295 
(2.127) 
-0.661 
(-0.774) 
GP -4.112 
(-3.442) 
-2.723 
(-1.731) 
1.389 
(1.174) 
TRUST -2.293 
(-2.240) 
-1.924 
(-1.424) 
0.368 
(0.293) 
PURCOMP -0.194 
(-1.801) 
-0.730 
(-1.058) 
-0.536 
(-0.919) 
PROVCOMP 0.351 
(0.386) 
0.127 
(0.446) 
-0.223 
(-0.966) 
EXTERNAL 3.303 
(3.125) 
4.466 
(3.630) 
1.162 
(1.624) 
D15 -0.416 
(-0.396) 
0.334 
(0.224) 
0.750 
(0.592) 
D19 -0.214 
(-0.214) 
1.458 
(1.563) 
1.672 
(2.078) 
D34 -2.340 
(-3.033) 
-0.807 
(-0.089) 
2.260 
(3.358) 
Table 5: Coefficient estimates ( ∂ ∂ln /P
P
X
j
k







 ) for Data Set 1. 
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  Block  Sophisticated 
Block  
 Other  
variable coefficient (t-ratio) coefficient (t-ratio) coefficient (t-ratio) 
constant -0.040 (-6.879) 0.153 (2.052) -0.113 (-1.324) 
AC -0.150 (-18.050) 0.123 (2.550) 0.027 (0.529) 
HNAC -0.142 (-22.883) 0.188 (3.325) -0.046 (-0.669) 
CS 0.058 (6.901) 0.062 (0.819) -0.120 (-1.087) 
MULTIPLE -0.297 (-21.458) 0.315 (4.327) -0.017 (-0.193) 
GP 0.306 (26.140) -0.362 (-4.420) 0.056 (0.577) 
TRUST 0.172 (19.937) -0.181 (-2.670) 0.009 (0.122) 
PURCOMP 0.017 (4.780) 0.013 (0.366) -0.030 (-0.685) 
PROVCOM -0.026 (-15.894) 0.036 (3.084) -0.011 (-0.531) 
EXTERNAL -0.256 (-18.365) 0.177 (2.512) 0.079 (0.975) 
D15 0.028 (3.858) -0.067 (-0.865) 0.039 (0.458) 
D19 0.008 (1.408) -0.099 (-1.523) 0.091 (1.183) 
D34 0.167 (37.217) -0.279 (-4.508) 0.112 (1.144) 
Table 6 : Marginal effects ( ∂ ∂P Xj / ) for Data Set 1.
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 Sophisticated Block 
relative to Block 
Other relative to Block Other relative to  
Sophisticated Block 
variable coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Constant -0.059 
(-1.168) 
-1.664 
(-2.715) 
-1.078 
(-2.217) 
AC 2.167 
(4.652) 
2.547 
(4.881) 
0.380 
(1.161) 
CS -0.125 
(-0.470) 
-0.415 
(-1.026) 
-0.289 
(-0.760) 
INFORMATION 0.148 
(2.090) 
0.165 
(1.762) 
0.018 
(0.223) 
CLINSIG 1.279 
(4.227) 
0.453 
(1.139) 
-0.927 
(-2.732) 
EXTERNAL 0.481 
(1.049) 
0.300 
(0.573) 
-0.180 
(-0.493) 
Table 7 : Coefficient estimates ( ∂ ∂ln /P
P
X
j
1







 ) for Data Set 2 
 Block  Sophisticated 
Block  
    Other  
variable coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
constant 0.109 6.090 0.052 0.758 -0.161 -1.763 
AC -0.308 -13.636 0.199 3.310 0.109 1.645 
CS 0.025 2.293 0.017 0.398 -0.043 -0.761 
INFORMATION -0.021 -7.767 0.015 1.415 0.006 0.496 
CLINSIG -0.154 -13.431 0.232 5.474 -0.078 -1.301 
EXTERNAL -0.061 -4.313 0.073 1.283 -0.017 -0.163 
       
Table 8 : Marginal effects ( ∂ ∂P Xj / ) for Data Set 2.
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Variable Expected effect on 
volume dependency 
Actual effect on 
volume depend-
ency 
Expected effect on 
cost dependency 
Actual effect on cost 
dependency 
AC + + + + 
HNAC ? +  - (if providers 
are ‘benevolent’) 
+ (otherwise) 
+ 
CS - - + ? 
MULTIPLE - (if risk dominates) 
? (otherwise) 
+ - (if risk dominates) 
+ (otherwise) 
+ 
TRUST + - + - 
EXT + + + + 
GP - - - - 
PURCOMP ? ? ? - 
PROVCMP ? ? ? ? 
CLINSIG ? + + + 
INF ? + ? + 
Table 9 : Predicted versus actual effects on cost and volume dependency in NHS contracts 
 
 
Figure 1: Forms of contracts observed 
Data set 1 Data set 2
Block
Sophisticated Block
Other
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Footnotes 
                                                           
1 Health Authorities are bodies charged with purchasing health services on behalf of their resident popula-
tion. They receive a cash limited budget determined according to a formula based on the population of their 
area weighted by age, sex and mortality. 
2Large GP practices may apply for  fundholder status, which provides them with a budget to purchase a pre-
defined range of services on behalf of their patients. Health Authorities purchase the remaining services for 
the patients of fundholding GPs and all services for patients of non-fundholders. 
3NHS Trusts are self-governing legal bodies that enjoy wide ranging powers to employ staff, set pay scales, 
enter into contracts, retain income and acquire or dispose of assets. However, these freedoms are subject to 
reservations and the Secretary of State for Health retains powers to intervene if a Trust’s activities are 
against the public interest. Details of the principles under which NHS Trusts are formed can be found in 
NHS Management Executive (1990). 
4From 1992 all contracts are required to have at least what was called an indicative volume. This provides 
an indication of the volume of services that was used in determining the lump sum payable. Indicative vol-
umes do not, however, affect the actual payment and hence, we do not distinguish between block contracts 
with indicative volumes and those without. 
5This same dichotomy between cost dependency and volume dependency of payments can be used to cate-
gorise payment systems in the US. Cost reimbursement of the kind used by Medicare prior to 1983, which 
has no equivalent in the NHS, for example, constitutes straightforward cost dependency whilst prospective 
payment supposedly entails only volume dependency except that, as noted above, McClellan (1997) finds 
some cost dependency even in prospective payment systems in practice. 
6It is not enough to rely on a the provider’s benevolence for it to return unused funds to the purchaser. Even 
a benevolent provider will want as large a budget as possible to spend on its own patients, whereas the pur-
chaser has to balance the interests of the patients of many different providers. 
7 The requirement on trusts is that they balance revenue and costs “taking one year with another” 
8 The marginal effects (Table 6 and Table 8) are calculated at sample means. Since these effects (and their 
standard errors) are non-linear functions of the observable variables and will therefore vary depending on 
the particular values of X at which they are evaluated, we are cautious about relying on the significance of 
marginal effects in deriving empirical findings. Hence, only the parameter estimates (Table 5 and Table 7) 
are used in deriving Table 9.  
9 Growth rates are determined from data on total number of Finished Consultant Episodes in the NHS, 
1960-1994 by running a regression ln( )N tt = + +β β ε0 1  , Nt where is the number of FCEs and t is a 
time trend. 
10 Given by the variance of the residuals of the regression above, which is a unit free measure of variation 
around trend growth. 
